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11 Introduction
Simple games ￿ also called voting games, or committees ￿ have played a
major role in the formal theory of committee voting. The key ingredients
in this type of cooperative game are: (i) a set of feasible alternatives; (ii) a
set of committee members (or voters); (iii) the committee members’ prefer-
ences over the set of feasible alternatives; and (iv) a collection of coalitions,
called winning coalitions, which are all-powerful in that they can rule out
any alternative irrespective of the other voters’ behavior. The details of the
institutional setting and the distribution of power among individuals lurk in
this collection of winning coalitions.
Although the concept of stable set, as de￿ned by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944), is central in the theory of cooperative games, it has so far
received little attention from political scientists who study committee voting
with the simple-game approach.1 The main reason for this is the absence
of informal ￿ but credible ￿ ￿stories￿ of individual interaction that would
provide interpretations for stable sets in the context of voting games. Para-
phrasing Ordeshook (1986), ￿the arguments for supposing that people choose
outcomes in [stable] sets often remain obscure￿.2 An important issue, then,
concerns the extent to which stable set predictions re￿ect the equilibrium
predictions of credible noncooperative games of negotiation and coalition
formation. Put di￿erently, given a stable set of a simple game, does there
exist an institutional arrangement that implements the stable set?
The present note is concerned with developing strategic foundations for
stable sets in simple games. The noncooperative framework we use to do
so, legislative bargaining, is based on the above-mentioned ingredients of
underlying simple games. At each stage in the negotiation, there is an initial
status quo, and a committee member is given the opportunity to propose
an alternative which is then voted up or down by the committee; if voted
up, the alternative is implemented and becomes the new status quo; if voted
down, the status quo remains unchanged and is implemented. An alternative
is accepted if and only if the set of voters who accept the proposal is a wining
coalition of the underlying simple game. The sequence repeats inde￿nitely.
We answer the question: ￿What reasons do we have to suppose that com-
mittees choose alternatives in stable sets?￿ by proving that, when voters
1The literature on the most familiar and widely-used solution concept, the core, is
immense and will not be surveyed here. Le Breton and Weber (1992) derive necessary
and su￿cient conditions for the core to constitute a vN-M stable set. Anesi (2006) shows
that alternatives in stable sets generalize the usual ￿corelike￿ stability notion to dynamic
cooperative settings.
2In Ordeshook’s book, stable sets are referred to as ￿V -sets￿.
2are su￿ciently farsighted, every stable set of the underlying simple game is
the limit set of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the noncoopera-
tive bargaining game. We further show that some of those equilibria have
desirable properties, namely Markov perfection and in particular strategic
stability (as de￿ned by Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), thus establishing a
relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games.
This short note thus contributes to the literature on noncooperative foun-
dations of cooperative solutions in voting games. These authors have devel-
oped noncooperative games of bargaining and coalition formation to provide
strategic foundations for a variety of cooperative solutions. Although this lit-
erature is now too large for us to give an exhaustive survey here, we should
just mention Harsanyi (1974), who uses a di￿erent bargaining setting to pro-
vide strategic foundations for stable sets in TU games. 3 To the best of our
knowledge, this note constitutes the ￿rst attempt to provide noncooperative
foundations for stable sets in a voting context with nontransferable utility.
More distantly related to this note is the political economy literature on
legislative bargaining models with an endogenous status quo. This includes
Baron (1996), Kalandrakis (2004), Battaglini and Coate (2007a,b), Battaglini
and Palfrey (2007), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007), and Diermeier and Fong
(2009a,b), to name a few.
We present the underlying simple game and the corresponding legislative
bargaining game in Section 2. In Section 3, we state and prove the central
result of this note.
2 Notation and De￿nitions
2.1 The Underlying Simple Game
Let N ´ f1;:::;ng denote the set of voters (or players), indexed by i, and
let N ´ 2N n f;g. Each member of N is referred to as a coalition. Every
voter i has preferences over a ￿nite set of alternatives X. These preferences
are represented by a linear order Âi on X. For future reference, we assume
that, for every i 2 N, Âi is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
payo￿ function ui : X ! R, such that for all (x;y) 2 X2: x Âi y if and only
if ui(x) > ui(y).
A simple game (or voting game) consists of a pair (N;W), where W µ N
is the collection of winning coalitions. Thus, we say that x 2 X dominates
y 2 X if, and only if, there is a coalition S 2 W such that ui(x) > ui(y), for
3The reader is referred to Montero (2006) and all the references therein for a more
comprehensive review of this literature.
3every i 2 S. Let D(y) denote the set of alternatives that dominate y. We
assume throughout that W is:
² monotonic: S 2 W and N ¶ T ¾ S ) T 2 W ;
² proper: S 2 W ) N n S = 2 W.
A set of alternatives V µ X is a stable set of (N;W) if, and only if, the two
following conditions hold:
x 2 V ) D(x) µ X n V; (1)
and
y 2 X n V ) 9x 2 V : x 2 D(y): (2)
These two conditions are called internal stability and external stability, re-
spectively. The existence and the uniqueness of stable sets is studied in Muto
(1984).
2.2 The Bargaining Game
We now present the legislative bargaining game based on(N;W).
Bargaining Procedure
In each of an in￿nite number of discrete periods, indexedt = 1;2;:::, mem-
bers of N have to collectively choose an alternativext from X. The sequential
bargaining process is as follows: At the start of each periodt, player i is cho-
sen with probability pi > 0 to make a proposal y 2 X; once the proposal is
made, all players simultaneously vote ￿yes￿ or ￿no￿. If the set of players who
vote ￿yes￿ belongs to W then xt = y; otherwise xt = xt¡1. In each period
t, xt¡1 is thus regarded as the status quo. For simplicity, we assume that
the status quo of period 1, x0, is chosen by Nature according to probability
distribution p0 on X such that p0 (fxg) > 0 for every x 2 X.
Once alternative xt has been chosen, every player i receives an instanta-
neous payo￿ (1 ¡ ±i)ui (xt), where ±i is i’s discount factor. Thus, player i’s
payo￿ from a bargaining sequence fxtg
1






A history at some stage of a given periodt describes all that has transpired in
the previous periods and stages (the sequence of proposers, their respective
proposals and the associated pattern of votes). This stage may be of various
4kinds: a proposer is about to be selected, or a proposal about to be made,
or voters about to vote, or an alternative about to be implemented. We
must therefore distinguish between the corresponding types of histories: ￿se-
lection histories￿, ￿proposer histories￿, ￿voter histories￿, and ￿implementation
histories￿ respectively.
A strategy ¾i for a player i is a mapping that assigns a probability distri-
bution over intended actions (what to propose, how to vote) to all conceivable
proposer and voter histories. Formally, let ∆X be the family of probability
distributions over X. Let Ht
p and Ht
v stand for the sets of possible proposer









each player i, let ¼t
i : Ht
p ! ∆X denote i’s proposal strategy for period t (con-
ditional on i being selected to make a proposal for t) and, for each h 2 Ht
p
and each x 2 X, let ¼t
i (h)(x) be the probability that proposer i makes pro-
posal x at history h. Player i’s voting strategy for period t is vt
i : Ht
v ! [0;1]
where, for every h 2 Ht
v, vt
i(h) is the probability that i votes ￿yes￿ at voter




t=1 is a strategy for i, and
¾ = f¾igi2N is a strategy pro￿le.
For each h 2 Ht
p, let rp(h) 2 X be the status quo prevailing at h, and
for each h 2 Ht
v, let rv(h) 2 X2 be the pair (x;y) where x is the ongoing
status quo and y is the proposal just made at h. For future reference, player
i’s strategy ¾i is said to be:
¡ a pure strategy if and only if, for any period t: ¼t
i(h)(x) 2 f0;1g for
all h 2 Ht
p and all x 2 X, and vt
i(h) 2 f0;1g for all h 2 Ht
v;
¡ a completely mixed strategy if and only if, for any periodt: ¼t
i(h)(x) >
0 for all h 2 Ht
p and all x 2 X, and vt
i(h) > 0 for all h 2 Ht
v;
¡ a Markovian strategy if and only if, for all periods t and t0: ¼t
i(h) =
¼t0
i (h0) for all h 2 Ht
p and h0 2 Ht0
p such that rp(h) = rp(h0), and vt
i(h) =
vt0
i (h0) for all h 2 Ht
v and h0 2 Ht0
v such that rv(h) = rv(h0).
Every strategy pro￿le ¾ generates a probability distribution over in￿nite
sequences of alternativesfxtg
1
t=1. Say that ¾ is absorbing if fxtg
1
t=1 converges
almost surely. For every period t, let P ¾
t : X2 ! [0;1] be the transition
probability engendered by ¾ such that P ¾
t (x;y) is the probability that xt = y
given that xt¡1 = x. The set of absorbing points of ¾ is then de￿ned as
A(¾) ´ fx 2 X : P
¾
t (x;x) = 1 , 8t = 1;:::;1g:
Equilibrium
As in the previous literature, we will concentrate on undominated subgame
perfect equilibria (SPEs) ￿ namely SPEs in which no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy ￿ and be particularly interested in Markov perfect equi-
5libria (MPEs) ￿ those in which players use Markovian strategies. However,
another equilibrium re￿nement will be used in the present note: Kohlberg’
and Mertens’ (1986) ￿strategic stability￿.4
A set Σ of Nash equilibria of the bargaining game isstable if it is minimal
with respect to the following property:
(P) Σ is a closed set of equilibria satisfying: for any" > 0 there exists some
³0 > 0 such that for any completely mixed strategy pro￿lef¾igi2N and
any numbersf³igi2N, with 0 < ³i < ³0, the perturbed game where every
strategy s of player i is replaced by (1 ¡ ³i)s+³i¾i has an equilibrium
that is within " of some equilibrium in Σ.5
SPEs that form a stable set are consistent with both the ideas of back-
ward and forward induction. We refer the reader to Kohlberg (1990) for an
extensive discussion of the latter concept.
The name ￿stable set￿ should not cause confusion with von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets as long as it is understood that a vN-M
stable set refers to a set of alternatives, whereas a strategically stable set
refers to a set of strategy pro￿les in the bargaining game. With this caveat
in mind, we now turn to the implementation of vN-M stable sets in the
noncooperative bargaining game.
3 Implementing a Stable Set
The main result of this note is the following proposition, which focuses on
situations where voters are farsighted. Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition
show that every stable set of the underlying simple game is the absorbing
set of undominated SPEs of the legislative bargaining game. Parts (iii) and
(iv) tell us that something stronger is actually true: there exist a set of un-
dominated pure-strategy MPEs and a strategically stable set of undominated
SPEs that all converge to the stable set under consideration.
4We refer the reader to De Sinopoli (2000, 2004), and De Sinopoli and Turrini (2002)
for a discussion of strategic stability in di￿erent political-economy models.
5Let Ai(h) be the ￿nite action set of player i at history h. That is, Ai(h) = X if h
is a proposer history at which i has been selected, and Ai(h) = fYes;Nog if h is a voter
history, and Ai(h) = ; otherwise. Thus, a strategy for player i at a given history h, say
¾i(h), is an element of ∆Ai(h). The distance between two strategy pro￿les ¾ and ¾0 is








6Proposition 1 Let V µ X be a stable set of the underlying simple game.
Then there exist a set of strategy pro￿les, Σ¤, and ¯ ± 2 (0;1) such that the
following is true whenever mini2N ±i > ¯ ±:
(i) A(¾¤) = V for every ¾¤ 2 Σ¤;
(ii) every ¾¤ in Σ¤ is an undominated SPE;
(iii) Σ¤ includes a subset of Markovian pure-strategy pro￿les; and
(iv) Σ¤ includes a subset that is stable.
To prove Proposition 1, we ￿rst de￿ne Σ¤ and ¯ ±. For every x = 2 V , pick
an arbitrary element, say ~ x, in the set V \D(x) which, by external stability,
is nonempty. For expositional convenience, we adopt the convention that
~ x = x when x 2 V . Note that, although there may be several functions,
x 7! ~ x, that satisfy these conditions, only one of them is chosen and kept
￿xed throughout the proof of Proposition 1. Let Σ¤ be the closed set of
strategy pro￿les that satisfy the following conditions:
At the proposer history h 2 Ht
p of period t with status quo x (namely xt¡1 =




k (h)(~ x) = 1 ; (3)
if x = 2 V and uk (~ x) < uk(x), then ¼t




k (h)(~ x) = 0 ; (4)
if x 2 V , then ¼t





k (h)(y) = 1 . (5)
At the voter history h 2 Ht
v of period t with status quo x and proposal y,





1 if ui (~ y) > ui (~ x)
0 otherwise, (6)





1 if ui (~ x) > ui (x)
0 otherwise. (7)
7Note that every ¾¤ 2 Σ¤ induces a time-independent transition process P ¾¤
such that P ¾¤
t = P ¾¤ for any period t.
We now de￿ne ¯ ±. For each player i 2 N, and every pair (x;y) 2 X2 such







1¡±i¸x [(1 ¡ ±i)ui(x) + ±i (1 ¡ ¸x)ui (~ x)] if x = 2 V
ui(x) if x 2 V:
Λi(x;y) ´ fi (y) ¡ fi (x):
A brief inspection of the above de￿nitions reveals that there exists¯ ±i(x;y) 2
(0;1) such thatΛi(x;y) belongs to the[ui (~ y) ¡ ui (~ x)]-neighborhood ofui (~ y)¡
ui (~ x) (and is therefore positive) whenever ±i > ¯ ±i(x;y). We de￿ne ¯ ± as





We now prove that A(¾¤) = V . When the status quo, sayx, is an element
of V , the proposer o￿ers a policy, say y, which is always rejected. Inspection
of (6)-(7) indeed reveals that y is accepted if and only if there is a winning
coalition of voters who all prefer ~ y to ~ x. But this is impossible since ~ x and ~ y
both belong to V which is internally stable.
Suppose now that the status quo, say x, is not a member of V . This
implies that ~ x 2 V \ D(x). Then, the coalition S of players who prefer ~ x
to x belongs to W. If the proposer is a member of S, then she proposes
~ x which, according to (7), is accepted. If the proposer is not a member of
S, she may propose another policy. But (6) tells us that this proposal is
rejected: V satisfying internal stability, the elements of V cannot dominate
each other. x consequently remains the status quo until the next period in-
volving a proposer in S. In that period, the proposer successfully proposes~ x.
A brief observation of conditions (3)-(7) reveals thatΣ¤ contains Marko-
vian pure-strategy pro￿les: If, at all proposer histories with status quo x,
proposer k always makes the same proposal, say yx, with a probability of 1,
then the behaviors prescribed by (3)-(7) de￿ne Markovian pure strategies.
This proves part (iii) of the proposition.
Let mini2N ±i > ¯ ±. To establish statement (ii), we must show that every
¾¤ 2 Σ¤ is an undominated SPE. We do this in two easy-to-prove steps.
8Step 1: For every i 2 N and x 2 X, de￿ne the value of x for voter i as
V
¾¤








Then, at the voter history h 2 Ht
v of all periods t with status quo x and
proposal y, vt
i(h) = 1 if and only if V ¾¤
i (y) > V ¾¤
i (x).
According to (3)-(7), we can write V ¾¤





1¡±i¸x [(1 ¡ ±i)ui(x) + ±i (1 ¡ ¸x)ui (~ x)] if x = 2 V
ui(x) if x 2 V
If y 6= ~ x, then ui (~ y) > ui (~ x) (or equivalently vt
i(h) = 1) implies that
V
¾¤
i (y) ¡ V
¾¤
i (x) = Λi(x;y) > 0 , (8)
where the last inequality results from ±i > ¯ ± ¸ ¯ ±i(x;y). By contrapositive,









[ui (~ x) ¡ ui(x)]: (9)
Step 2: At the proposer history h 2 Ht
p of any period t starting with status
quo x, proposer k cannot gain by deviating from ¼t
k(h) and conforming to ¾¤
k
thereafter.
Suppose ￿rst that the status quo x belongs to V . In such a case, any
proposal by k is rejected by the committee. Therefore, any proposal is a best
response and there is no pro￿table deviation from (5).
If x = 2 V , then k must compare the value from o￿ering~ x, uk (~ x), with the
value from o￿ering any other policy y, V ¾¤
k (x). Thus, it is optimal for k to
propose ~ x if uk (~ x) > u(x), and any other policy otherwise. This proves that
she has no pro￿table deviation from (3) and (4).
By the one-shot deviation principle, Steps 1 and 2 establish that every
¾¤ 2 Σ¤ is an undominated SPE, thus proving part (ii) of Proposition 1. Let
Σ¤




t=1 satisfying (3)-(7) for player i. Note
that, by construction, any element ofΣ¤
i is a best response to any element of
£j6=iΣ¤
j, for every i 2 N.
We now turn to part (iv). The proof is by contradiction. Fix " > 0.
Suppose there is a sequence ³m
0 , with limm!1 ³m
0 = 0, such that: for all





n , with 0 < ³m
i < ³m
0 , such that the perturbed game
9where every strategy s of player i is replaced by (1 ¡ ³m
i )s + ³m
i ¾m
i has no








i , for each i 2 N.
For every proposer history h 2 Ht
p, let Πt
k(h) be the ￿nite set of degener-
ate probability distributions, ¼t
k(h), satisfying conditions (3)-(5).6 Similarly,
for every voter history h 2 Ht
v, let vt
i(h) 2 f0;1g be uniquely de￿ned by
conditions (6)-(7). Then, de￿neGm as the legislative-bargaining game where


















and the ￿action set￿ of player i at voter history h 2 Ht








Thus, for each m, Gm is an in￿nite-horizon game with a ￿nite number of
possible actions at each history. Fudenberg and Levine (1983) establish the
existence of a SPE in such games. Therefore, Gm has an equilibrium, which
in turn implies by construction that there exists ˆ ¾m = (ˆ ¾m
1 ;:::; ˆ ¾m
n ) 2 Σ¤
such that, for every player i, (1 ¡ ³m
i ) ˆ ¾m
i + ³m
i ¾m
i is a best response within
f(1 ¡ ³m
i )&i + ³m
i ¾m












One can ￿nd a su￿ciently largeM1 > 0 such that ˘ ¾m ´ f(1 ¡ ³m




is within " of ˆ ¾m whenever m > M1.7 By assumption, the perturbed game
where every strategy s of player j (not necessarily in Σ¤






j has no equilibrium within " of ˆ ¾m. As a consequence,
for each m, there is a strategy ˜ ¾m
i = 2 Σ¤
i such that some player i can prof-
itably deviate from (1 ¡ ³m
i ) ˆ ¾m
i + ³m
i ¾m
i to (1 ¡ ³m
i ) ˜ ¾m
i + ³m
i ¾m
i . Put di￿er-
ently, i can gain by playing ˜ ¾m
i = 2 Σ¤ instead of ˆ ¾m








The reminder of the proof shows that this leads to a contradiction. By
the one-shot deviation principle, we can restrict attention to strategies ˜ ¾m
i
that agree with ˆ ¾m
i at all histories in H (at which i is active) but one. We
must distinguish between several cases:
a) ˜ ¾m
i disagrees with ˆ ¾m
i at a proposer history of a period with status quo
x = 2 V and ui (~ x) > ui(x). From (9), ˆ ¾m 2 Σ¤ implies that V ˆ ¾m
i (~ x) > V ˆ ¾m
i (x)
for all m. As ˜ ¾m
i is a strictly pro￿table deviation from ˆ ¾m
i , there must be
a proposal y 6= ~ x such that i can gain by proposing y instead of ~ x. As m
becomes arbitrarily large, however, ˘ ¾m becomes arbitrarily close to ˆ ¾m. Since
6Note that jΠt
k(h)j = 1 whenever h is a proposer history of period t with status quo x
such that x = 2 V and uk (~ x) > uk(x).
7Using the notation introduced in Footnote 5, we have d(ˆ ¾m; ˘ ¾m) ·
suph2H [³m
0 dh (ˆ ¾m(h);¾m(h))]. As dh (ˆ ¾m(h);¾m(h)) < njXj for all h and ³m
0 ! 0, this
inequality implies that there exists M1 such that d(ˆ ¾m; ˘ ¾m) < " whenever m > M1.
10˜ ¾m
i agrees with ˆ ¾m
i after i’s proposal, i’s continuation payo￿ from proposing
y [resp. ~ x] becomes by continuity arbitrarily close toV ˆ ¾m
i (x) [resp. V ˆ ¾m
i (~ x)]
(under ˆ ¾m 2 Σ¤, proposal y is rejected and proposal ~ x is accepted). As a
consequence, the gain from the deviation is arbitrarily close to V ˆ ¾m
i (x) ¡
V ˆ ¾m
i (~ x) < 0 for arbitrarily large values of m . This is a contradiction with
˜ ¾m
i being a pro￿table deviation for all m.
b) ˜ ¾m
i disagrees with ˆ ¾m
i at a proposer history of a period with sta-
tus quo x = 2 V and ui (~ x) < ui(x). From (9), ˆ ¾m 2 Σ¤ implies that
V ˆ ¾m
i (~ x) < V ˆ ¾m
i (x). As ˜ ¾m
i is a strictly pro￿table deviation from ˆ ¾m
i and
˜ ¾m
i = 2 Σ¤
i, proposer i must be strictly better-o￿ proposing ~ x rather than the
randomization prescribed by ˆ ¾m
i . By the same argument as in a), however,
the gain from doing so becomes arbitrarily close to V ˆ ¾m
i (~ x) ¡ V ˆ ¾m
i (x) < 0
as m becomes arbitrarily large. This is a contradiction with ˜ ¾m
i being a
pro￿table deviation for all m.
c) ˜ ¾m
i disagrees with ˆ ¾m
i at a proposer history of period with a status quo
belonging to V . From (5) and ˜ ¾m
i = 2 Σ¤
i, this is impossible.
d) ˜ ¾m
i disagrees with ˆ ¾m
i at a voter history. As ˜ ¾m
i is supposed to be
a pro￿table deviation from ˆ ¾m
i for all m, voter i must be pivotal with a
positive probability, say °m







j (i.e., i must belong to at least one minimal winning
coalition). Let the status quo and the proposal be x and y, respectively,
and suppose without loss of generality that ˆ ¾m
i prescribes i to vote ￿yes￿ at
this history. From Step 1 above, this implies that V ˆ ¾m
i (y) > V ˆ ¾m
i (x). By
assumption, voteri can pro￿tably deviate from ˆ ¾m
i by voting ￿no￿ instead. As
°m
i > 0, this implies that i’s expected payo￿ from x remaining the status quo
given ˘ ¾m, say ˘ Âm
i;x, is strictly greater than her expected payo￿ from y being
implemented given ˘ ¾m, say ˘ Âm
i;y. By the same argument as in a), however,
˘ Âm
i;x ¡ ˘ Âm
i;y becomes arbitrarily close to V ˆ ¾m
i (x) ¡ V ˆ ¾m
i (y) < 0 as m becomes
arbitrarily large; a contradiction.
This proves that Σ¤ satis￿es property (P). Let the family of subsets of
Σ¤ that satisfy (P), S, be ordered by set inclusion. By Zorn’s Lemma,S has
a minimal element. This completes the proof of the proposition.
What reasons do we have to suppose that committees choose alterna-
tives in stable sets? The answer of Proposition 1 to this question is that
predictions supported by vN-M stable sets are highly consistent with those
supported by undominated pure-strategy MPEs on the one hand, and by
strategically stable sets of undominated SPEs of the legislative bargaining
game on the other hand. Parts (i) and (ii) provide bargaining foundations
for vNM stable sets with a setΣ¤ of absorbing (undominated) equilibria that
satisfy subgame perfection. Then parts (iii) and (iv) go further, stating that
11Σ¤ includes a set of pure-strategy MPEs and a strategically stable set. Two
remarks are in order here. First, beyond the interpretation of vNM stable
sets, part (iii) also contributes to the growing literature on the existence of
pure-strategy MPEs and the characterization of equilibrium absorbing sets
in in￿nite-horizon legislative-bargaining games with an evolving status quo. 8
The second remark concerns strategic stability. Contrary to the de￿nitions
of stable sets provided in Mertens (1989, 1991) and Hillas (1990), Kohlberg’
and Mertens’ (1986) de￿nition fails to satisfy one of the requirements for
strategic stability, namely backward induction. Having established subgame
perfection in part (ii), it is however su￿cient and more natural to look for an
equilibrium re￿nement that captures theother aspects of strategic stability;
Kohlberg’s and Mertens’ (1986) stable set does so.
A brief inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that both internal
and external stabilities play a decisive role in the de￿nition of Σ¤. We end
this note with some observations about these conditions. Internal stability
is in fact a necessary condition for a set of alternatives to be the absorbing
set of an undominated SPE of the bargaining game.
Observation 1 If strategy pro￿le ¾ is an absorbing, undominated SPE of
the bargaining game, then A(¾) satis￿es internal stability.
Proof: Let ¾ be an absorbing, undominated SPE and suppose that, con-
trary to the above statement, A(¾) does not satisfy internal stability. This
implies that there exist two distinct policies x;y 2 A(¾) and S 2 W such
that ui(x) > ui(y) for every i 2 S.
After the implementation of y, proposing (successfully in an undomi-
nated SPE) x would therefore make any proposer in S strictly better-o￿
than proposing any other policy that would not change the status quo y.
This is a contradiction with ¾ being a SPE.
¤
While combining external stability with internal stability is su￿cient to
obtain the properties stated in Proposition 1, external stability is not a nec-
essary condition. Indeed, a set of alternatives that is internally but not
externally stable may have those properties. A simple example shows this.
Example 1 Let N = f1;2;3;4;5;6g and X = fw;x;y;zg, and let W be the
8See Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007), and Diermeier and Fong (2009a,b), for instance.
12set of majority coalitions. Voters’ preferences overX are as follows:
x Â1 z Â1 y Â1 w
y Â2 z Â2 x Â2 w
w Â3 z Â3 y Â3 x
y Â4 z Â4 w Â4 x
w Â5 z Â5 x Â5 y
x Â6 z Â6 w Â6 y
Note ￿rst of all that fzg is a stable set of (N;W) and, by Proposition 1,
is an absorbing set of strategically stable SPEs of the corresponding bar-
gaining game for any pro￿le of payo￿ functions fui(¢)gi=1;:::;6. Consider now
fw;x;yg. This set of alternative is internally stable but not externally stable













[ui(w) + ui(x) + ui(y)];8i 2 f1;3g;
the bargaining game with recognition probabilities pi = 1=3, 8i 2 N, has a
stable set of undominated SPEs, ¾, such that A(¾) = fw;x;yg when mini ±i
is su￿ciently close to 1.
¤
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